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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS 
 
Upstream – Federal  
 
U.S. Tax Court 
Adams Challenge UK Ltd. v. Comm’r, No. 4816-15, 2020 WL 95692 (T.C. 
Jan. 8, 2020). 
 
Company owns a support vessel which decommissions oil and gas wells 
and removes debris from hurricanes around the U.S. Continental Shelf. IRS 
claimed that Company’s income from the vessel was subject to tax under 
the IRS code and subject to the bilateral income tax treaty between the 
United States and the U.K. First, the court considered whether the income 
from the vessel was subject to Federal income tax. The test that the court 
utilized asked whether Company’s income was “effectively connected with 
the conduct of a trade or business within the united states.” The court 
determined that section 638 of the IRS code provided jurisdiction over 
continental shelf areas for activities “with respect to mines, oil and gas 
wells, and other natural deposits.” Further, the court determined that 
Company’s income applied to this provision because their activity related to 
the exploitation of natural resources, even though that relationship was not 
direct and immediate. As a result, the court found that post-production 
activities were related to the exploitation of oil and gas wells under the IRS 
code. In sum, because the income was derived from the use of property and 
the performance of services in the U.S., its income was sourced in the U.S. 
and subject to the IRS tax code. Finally, the court held that the income was 
subject to the Treaty between the U.S. and the U.K. by looking to the 
language of section 638 and finding that it was intentionally analogous to 
the treaty. Because Company’s activities were undertaken offshore, under 
article 21 of the Treaty, their activity did not exempt their vessel’s income 
from Federal income tax. 
 
N.D. Ohio 
Bounty Minerals, LLC v. Chesapeake Expl., LLC, No. 5:17cv1695, (N.D. 
Ohio Dec. 23, 2019).  
 
Operator brought a motion to strike and a motion for summary judgment 
against Oil Company. This dispute involved 6 leases held by Oil Company 
from 2013-2015; the leases varied with regard to royalty provisions on oil. 
Operator was the lessee under the leases. Oil Company argued that the 
revenue statements that it received were substantially less than the sales of 
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hydrocarbons with wells in the same vicinity, and during the same time 
frame. Operator requested summary judgment on three separate counts 
regarding the issue: Breach of Contract based on the alleged breach or 
Royalties Provisions; breach of the express covenants of good faith and 
reasonable prudent operator; and breach of the affiliate sales provision. For 
the first count, the key issue hinged on whether the phrase “computed at the 
wellhead applied to both sales to unaffiliated purchasers, and affiliated 
entities. The court agreed with Operator’s contention that the phrase applied 
to both aforementioned entities. Secondly, the court sided with Operator on 
the issue of whether there had been a breach of good faith and reasonable 
prudent operator because Operator had paid royalties to Oil Company 
consistent with the lease royalty provision when it calculated royalties 
based on the value of the gas and oil “at the wellhead.” Finally, the court, 
again, ruled with Operator as to whether there had been a breach of the 
affiliate sales provision. The court found that royalties were properly 
calculated at the wellhead via the netback method, and that there was no 
issue of material fact that the sales prices were not comparable to values 
that could be obtained in an arms-length transaction. 
 
Midstream – State 
 
Delaware 
Marubeni Spar One, LLC v. Williams Field Servs. – Gulf Coast Co., L.P., 
C.A. No. 2018-0908-SG, 2020 WL 64761 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 2019). 
 
Partner sued Operating Partner over the calculation of expenses for a floating 
oil and gas production system in the Gulf of Mexico. Partner sued under five 
counts: (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of fiduciary duty, (3) breach of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing, (4) request for declaratory judgment 
regarding costs, and (5) request for an injunction regarding allocation of 
costs. Operating Partner moved to dismiss the action under Rule 12(b)(6). 
The court found that, given the complexity of the operation and the parties’ 
competing contractual interpretations, the court could not decide counts 1 and 
4 as a matter of law and denied the motion to dismiss. Additionally, the court 
found that count 5 survived the motion to dismiss because it was not a 
freestanding cause of action due to asking for equitable relief. The court 
found that count 3 must be dismissed as a deficient pleading because the 
application of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which is 
used as a gap-filler in Delaware courts, is inapplicable where the parties 
clearly contracted over the calculation of expenses. Finally, the court found 
that count 2 must be dismissed because the duty to allocate costs arose 
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through their contract so the claim rests in breach of contract, rather than 
common-law breach of fiduciary duty. 
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS 
 
Federal 
 
M.D. Florida  
Miller v. City of Fort Myers, No. 2:18-cv-195-FtM-38NPM, 2020 WL 
60155 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2020).  
 
Property Owners sued the City of Fort Myers (the “City”) over water 
contamination caused by the City’s dumping of lime sludge, a highly 
arsenic substance, on a Site it owned. The sludge remained dormant on the 
Site for over fifty years until Property Owners sued. The City then began 
clean up and remediation efforts to remove all the sludge, and once 
accomplished, won summary judgement in its favor. Property Owners’ suit 
against the City was predicated on the expansive language from the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (the “Act”), which stated that a 
person who has contributed to a disposal of hazardous waste may be sued 
for imminent and substantial dangers to public health. Although the sludge 
was removed, Property Owners could still show the District Court that a 
serious harm threatened to occur either now or in the near future through 
any of the four pathways of arsenic exposure. Property Owners’ evidence 
however, did not support this as a reasonable inference, and thus failed to 
rise to the summary judgement ruling standard. Arsenic could travel 
through groundwater like wells, but testing of the wells near the Site shows 
no arsenic exposure. And for the wells that showed some level of arsenic, 
the record showed that no one drank from them and that the wells were 
opposite the direction where groundwater would naturally flow from the 
Site. Similar findings resulted from the remaining exposure pathways of 
soil, dust, and skin exposure. The arsenic levels found on these pathways 
did not exceed federally approved levels. Therefore, Property Owners’ 
federal claims were dismissed, and the Court declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claims. 
 
E.D. New York 
Cornett v. Northrop Grumman Corp., No. 18CV06453DRHAKT, 2020 WL 
59794 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2020). 
 
Corporation owned multiple sites in Bethpage, New York and also operated 
a reserve plant on behalf of the U.S. Navy. Individuals all lived in Bethpage 
and were diagnosed with cancer within two years of one another, likely due 
to contamination in their drinking water. In a negligence and strict liability 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
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lawsuit against Corporation, Individuals alleged that Corporation 
discharged various hazardous contaminants into the Bethpage’s 
groundwater systems. Notably, Corporation once owned an 18-acre 
hazardous waste dump site, which Corporation later donated to the Town of 
Oyster Bay, who then converted the site into a community park for 
children. Corporation did not disclose its previous dumping activities on the 
land. Children played little league baseball at Bethpage Community park, 
drank from its water fountains, and were exposed to its grass sprinkler 
systems. Individuals alleged that surrounding communities found volatile 
organic compounds (“VOC”) known to cause kidney and testicular cancer 
in their drinking water. These VOC’s were found at about 3000 times the 
acceptable level. Likewise, different semi-volatile organic compounds and 
metals were also found in the same areas. Corporation moved to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); 
however, Corporation’s motion was predicated on evidence outside of the 
complaint itself, which is inappropriate at preliminary stages. As a result, 
the court denied Corporation’s motion to dismiss because Individuals 
pleaded enough facts to make a plausible claim for relief, and a motion to 
dismiss for failure to sufficiently plead a case deals specifically with what is 
in the complaint rather than what is out of it. Furthermore, even though the 
U.S. Navy enjoys immunity from strict liability claims, it is doubtful 
whether the immunity extends to Corporation. 
 
D. Vermont 
Sullivan v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., No. 5:16-cv-125, 
2019 WL 7282104 (D. Vt. Dec. 27, 2019). 
 
A class of homeowners (“Class”) brought a class action suit against a 
Plastic Company for contamination of groundwater with harmful 
substances. Class sought to have the remedy of medical monitoring 
damages and/or creation of a new cause of action for medical monitoring 
damages. The court declined to create a new cause of action as they are 
federal court sitting in diversity, and they cannot create new law within the 
state. Plastic Company argued against the inclusion of medical monitoring 
damages because it would place a duty upon them to those who may not 
have a physical injury, a requirement for tort damages in Vermont. 
However, the court stated that because of the ease of setting an objective 
test for exposure to the chemicals and the relatively small number of 
potential victims, that it is likely a Vermont court would allow for the 
medical monitoring damages to be imposed despite the physical injury 
requirement. Class sought summary judgement as to their entitlement to 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss4/9
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these damages, but the court denied it because “almost every fact in the 
case is at dispute.” Plastic Company filed their own motion for summary 
judgement stating that the monitoring should not be available because the 
class has not shown evidence of specific or general causation. However, the 
court rejected this argument for the same reasoning as for the inclusion of 
medical monitoring damages. On the question of specific or general 
causation, the court stated that it would defer this decision to trial because 
although general causation looks right at this time, the lack of expert 
testimony showing each class members specific causation of health risk 
precludes summary judgement. Plastic Company also raised the argument 
that the class members had substantial differences, as two of the members 
did not have the requisite contamination levels. The court stated that the 
time to bring this concern had already passed. Furthermore, the plastics 
corporation claimed that some class members already received monitoring 
and therefore there would be an overlap in remedy. The court stated that 
this was a non-issue because the plastics corporation would only be on the 
hook for extra monitoring, not existing monitoring if they lost at trial. For 
these reasons, the court denied both parties’ motions for summary 
judgment. 
 
State  
 
New York 
Beer v. Town of New Paltz, No. 528273, 2020 WL 97038 (N.Y. App. Div. 
Jan. 9, 2020).  
 
The New York City Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) 
maintained different counties’ water supply needs, including the Town of 
New Paltz (“New Paltz”). DEP sought to undergo a maintenance project in 
its systems which would cause an extended water supply interruption for 
New Paltz. Thus, New Paltz discovered an alternative water source and 
entered into a resolution with DEP for funding. After the resolution was 
finalized, New Paltz entered a petition to establish a new water district. 
Property Owner challenged the petition, but the New York Supreme Court 
dismissed Property Owner’s case against New Paltz; Property Owner 
appealed. Property Owner alleged that New Paltz did not properly describe 
the boundaries of the new water district pursuant to Town Law § 191. The 
Court responded that Property Owner’s allegations were unfounded because 
New Paltz substantially met the requirement of boundary description 
through the maps and list of tax map identification numbers provided. 
Property Owner also asserted that New Paltz petition included fraudulent 
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misrepresentations, but this assertion also failed because the Court found 
that Property Owner’s allegations were merely conclusory in nature. 
Property Owner further alleged that New Paltz did not give proper notice of 
the details contained in New Paltz petition in accordance with Town Law § 
191 and §193. This cause of action was found to be without merit because 
the reports submitted by New Paltz sufficiently outlined the details of the 
petition along with the estimated cost to the average user. Next, Property 
Owner claimed that New Paltz failed to provide the required signatures 
needed for the petition to stand, but the Court also found this allegation to 
be properly dismissed since the requirement was met. As such, the Court 
affirmed the dismissal of all of Property Owner’s allegations. 
 
Washington 
Estate of Carter v. Carden, 455 P.3d 197 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019). 
 
In 1986, Homeowners divided their property into two lots, A and B. They 
subsequently built a water well on lot A and granted Lot B Owners an 
easement to use the well. After Homeowners died in 2013, their Estate 
executed a purchase sale agreement (“2013 PSA”) conveying Lot B to 
Buyer. This suit arose when the Estate sought to modify the 2013 PSA. The 
Estate accused Buyer of tortious interference of its attempted sale of Lot A, 
as well as failure to act in good faith and fair dealing; Buyer countered with 
a breach of contract claim. The trial judge granted partial summary 
judgement in favor of the Estate, but the appellate court, under 
discretionary review, reversed for two reasons: (1) the trial judge applied 
the standard for summary judgement backwards; and (2) the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing does not require Buyer to agree to a substantial 
modification from the original 2013 PSA. First, in granting summary 
judgement, the trial judge accepted as true the Estate’s allegation that Buyer 
harassed Lot A’s potential buyer in an attempt to block Lot A’s sale. Buyer, 
who denied this allegation, was the non-movant, and the trial judge should 
have considered evidence in favor of the non-movant rather than the 
movant, here the Estate. Second, the Estate sought to substantially modify 
the 2013 PSA in an attempt to sell Lot A to new buyers by including a 30-
day signing requirement that was not part of the 2013 PSA. The 
modification was substantial, such that it could not have been reasonably 
implied during the initial contract negotiations. Therefore, Buyer did not 
breach the duty of good faith and fair dealing by refusing to sign the 
modified agreement and was under no obligation to sign the Estate’s 2013 
PSA. 
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SELECTED LAND DECISIONS 
 
Federal  
 
E.D. Louisiana 
Pan Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Acquisitions Corp., No. CV 13-5027-
WBV-DMD, 2020 WL 68612 (E.D. La. Jan. 7, 2020). 
 
Insurance Company and Hotel Corporation filed cross motions for 
summary judgment on the issue of Insurance Company’s liability for 
attorney’s fees arising out of a dispute regarding the parties’ operation of a 
hotel. Prior to the suit, Hotel Corporation entered into an agreement with 
Insurance Company, selling their interest in the hotel in exchange for a 
release of all claims by Insurance Company. After executing the agreement, 
Insurance Company filed suit. The court ruled that Hotel Corporation could 
be awarded attorney’s fees for the contract action, despite not seeking 
rescission of the entire contract. The court reasoned that although there was 
no contractual provision authorizing it, and breach of contract claims 
normally do not allow for attorney’s fees, the Hotel Corporation could be 
awarded attorney’s fees based on a theory of fraud. The court further noted 
that the record unequivocally showed that the communications of the 
Insurance Company exhibited their intent to file a lawsuit after Hotel 
Corporation conveyed their interest in the hotel in exchange for the release 
of claims. As such, attorney’s fees were recoverable by Hotel Corporation 
as a means of punishment of Insurance Company’s fraudulent conduct. 
 
D. New Jersey 
Mensah v. Manning, No. 18-9247, 2020 WL 91089 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2020). 
 
Homeowner brought action against Mortgage Company after Homeowner 
defaulted on a home loan and Mortgage Company commenced a 
foreclosure action in state court. Homeowner’s original complaint was 
dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Homeowner amended its 
complaint, and Mortgage Company subsequently filed a second motion to 
dismiss. The district court granted Mortgage Company’s motion to dismiss 
with prejudice because Homeowner’s amended complaint failed to establish 
which of the nine named defendants, if any, had violated federal law, even 
after being given the opportunity to amend their pleading deficiencies under 
Rule 8(a)(2), was on notice of the deficiencies, and failed to cure the 
deficiencies. 
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State  
 
California 
Hale v. Cerro Pampa LLC, No. A154602, 2019 WL 7479499 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Dec. 30, 2019). 
 
This case determined whether the elements of an implied easement were 
met on two parcels of land that were previously joined and owned by one 
family. The trial court found that an implied easement existed, but the 
appellate court reversed for two reasons: (1) The elements of implied 
easements were not sufficiently satisfied; and (2) there was not an adequate 
showing of necessity at the time properties were conveyed. The property in 
question was a ranch once owned together by Homeowners. After their 
death, the ranch was divided amongst Homeowner’s Relatives, with parcel 
36 and parcel 38 carved out. Two different owners had parcel 36 and 38 
(“Owner 36” and “Owner 38”). Adjacent to parcel 36 was a Third Property. 
Following the death of Owner 36, Relatives and the Trustee of Owner 36 
sued Owner 38 in order to gain an implied easement in favor of parcel 36 
over parcel 38. First, the appellate court rejected Trustee’s contention that 
an implied easement existed. The court reasoned that the prior use of parcel 
36 would not have led Owner 38 to believe that a permanent easement 
existed over his property, especially because Owner 36 and Third Property 
Owner did not renew their grazing lease. Thus, the Trustee failed to satisfy 
the second element of establishing an implied easement because Trustee 
could not show that Owner 38 knew an easement across parcel 38 existed. 
Second, Trustee did not demonstrate that a necessity existed for Owner 36 
to gain access to the main road through parcel 38. Evidence of prior use 
showed that Owner 36 often accessed the main road through Third Property 
rather than parcel 38. 
 
Maryland 
Anderson v. Great Bay Solar I, LLC., 243 Md. App. 557 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2019). 
 
Farmer owns two farming properties in Somerset County, the Ira Barnes 
Farm and the Ben Barnes Farm. In 2015, County entered into an agreement 
with Solar Company to install systems below and along county roads 
intersecting the farms to transport power from solar panels. Farmer 
contested Solar Company’s installations, claiming that they had fee simple 
ownership of the roadbeds where Solar Company was burying the 
collection systems and they were trespassing by laying the systems down. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol5/iss4/9
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Experts traced title of the farms and noted that a common law dedication of 
property generally conveys to the government and the public only an 
easement. The court found Farmer owned the land under the roads, subject 
to the County’s easement for the road. Based on the evidence by statute and 
common law, Farmer established ownership of the land underneath the road 
at issue. As for the trespass claim, the court remanded the issue to the 
circuit court in order to ascertain the purpose of the easement. Whether it is 
for passing and repassing, or whether the easement would have allowed for 
the collection systems to be implemented. As to the issue of whether 
Farmer waived the right to contest Solar Company’s system, evidence of 
participation in county meetings and his refusal to permit the system 
sufficed to prove that he did not relinquish his right to contest the 
installation of the cables, nor does the doctrine of estoppel take effect 
because he did not vote to approve the cable installation at the county 
meetings. Finally, the Farmer’s equitable claims were barred by the 
doctrine of laches because of their unreasonable delaying filing suit. Farmer 
knew that construction was scheduled to occur and did not assert the claim 
until the company had incurred costs installing the equipment. As a result, 
the circuit court’s decision was affirmed in part and reversed in part for 
further proceedings. 
 
Minnesota 
In re. Minn. Power's Petition for Approval of EnergyForward Res. 
Package, No. A19-0688, 2019 WL 7042812 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 
2019). 
 
This case stemmed from the decision of the Minnesota Public Utilities 
Commission (“Commission”) to approve Utility Company’s affiliated-
interest agreements with Energy Company to construct and operate a power 
plant located in Wisconsin. In Minnesota, affiliated-interest agreements are 
not effective unless Commission approves them. The Minnesota 
Environmental Policy Act (“MEPA”) requires government agencies like 
Commission to consider environmental consequences and to minimize 
negative impacts on the environment when deciding whether to approve 
any and all projects. Clean Energy Organizations were concerned with the 
potential negative environmental effects of the proposed power plant and 
petitioned the Minnesota Environmental Quality Board (“EQB”) for an 
environmental assessment worksheet (“EAW”) to be prepared with respect 
to the proposed plant. EQB then referred the decision whether to grant the 
petition for the EAW to the Commission, which subsequently denied the 
EAW petition while approving the affiliated-interest agreements to 
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construct and operate the new power plant, with conditions. Clean Energy 
Organizations then appealed Commission’s decisions regarding the denial 
of the EAW and the approval of the power plant. The two issues on appeal 
were whether MEPA applied to affiliated-interest agreements and whether 
Commission had the duty to order an EAW for a project located outside of 
Minnesota. The appellate court held that because MEPA applies to 
affiliated-interest agreements and Commission does not lack jurisdiction to 
order an EAW for a power plant proposal outside of Minnesota that impacts 
the state’s environment, Commission erred by denying the EAW petition 
and subsequently approving the affiliated-interest agreements without first 
determining whether the proposed project would have the potential for 
significant environmental effects. Accordingly, the court remanded the case 
for Commission to make this determination. 
 
North Carolina 
North Carolina, ex rel. Regan v. Wasc, LLC, No. COA19-355, 2020 WL 
63913 (N.C. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2020).  
 
Financial Assurance Company (“FAC”) appealed the trial court decision 
denying their motion to dismiss and granted the State’s motion for 
summary judgment. The dispute surrounded whether FAC was the operator 
of the property in question when the State requested a “Part B post closure 
permit . . . under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. FAC stated 
that they were not the operator as the land had been sold to another party 
before the closing plan and documents could be completed. When the third 
party refused to be responsible to the state requirements, litigation resulted, 
and the court found FAC to be the operator in regard to the 3
rd
 party in 
Wasco I. FAC did not complete a post-closure permit. State then filed suit. 
In the present case, FAC relied on new regulations hoping for an alternate 
outcome, because the new regulations made the old request by State moot. 
However, the court stated that nothing in the new regulations make changes 
the liability of the provider regarding the post-closure permit. FAC also 
argued that State failed to enjoin a necessary party, the third party from 
Wasco I. However, the court stated that dismissal would be inappropriate 
because the third party is known and able to be enjoined should it be 
deemed necessary. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision granting the 
state’s motion for summary judgement because no issues of material facts 
remained to be settled. FAC also argued that the trial court decision 
required them to do the impossible in order to comply with the judgement 
due to the current state of regulations and the third party’s refusal to sign 
the permit. The court rejects the argument because the order does not 
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require the signature of the third party only that FAC act in good faith in 
drafting and submitting the permit. For these reasons, the court affirmed the 
trial court and Wasco I findings that FAC was the operator of the land and 
is liable for obtaining the post-closing permit. 
 
Ohio 
Erickson v. Morrison, No. 19CA18, 2019 WL 7369242 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Dec. 30, 2019). 
 
This case concerned a dispute over mineral interests of approximately 139 
acres. Transferor sold its property’s surface rights but reserved the mineral 
rights. Transferor later sold the mineral rights to Transferee. Through 
transfers of sale, Landowners eventually took title to the surface rights. In 
2015, Landowners sued Transferor, claiming that Landowners owned the 
surface and minerals of the property pursuant to the Ohio Marketable Title 
Act. The trial court granted summary judgement in favor of Landowners. In 
the issue at hand, Transferee sued Landowners and Transferor. The trial 
court granted Transferee’s motion for declaratory relief and quiet title. This 
appeal was brought by Landowners seeking a declaratory judgment 
establishing that they are in full possession of the property’s surface and 
mineral rights. The primary issue on appeal concerned whether Transferee’s 
reservation of mineral interest was stated with sufficient specificity. 
Landowners argue, pursuant to the Ohio Marketable Title Act, that 
Transferee’s mineral rights were extinguished because they did not contain 
information identifying the owner of the mineral rights in the title 
documents, and therefore were deemed a “general reference” which does 
not preserve the mineral interests. Because the 40-year time window from 
the root of title had passed, the mineral rights were extinguished by 
operation of law. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the decision of 
the trial court in favor of Landowners. 
 
Pennsylvania 
Wayco Sand and Gravel v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 713 C.D. 2018, 2020 
WL 57943 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 6, 2020). 
 
Lessee conducted gravel processing operations on Landowner’s land and 
was required to return the land to original condition after the lease expired. 
Lessee left two silt ponds on the land, as well as large piles of material. 
Lessee applied for and obtained a release of liability from the Department 
of Environmental Protection (“DEP”) stating that Lessee had returned the 
land to original condition, despite the left-over structures. Landowner 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
828 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 5 
  
 
appealed the DEP’s release, but the appeal was denied. Landowner then 
appealed the DEP’s issuance of release to the Environmental Hearing Board 
(“EHB”), who found that the remaining silt ponds and material-piles left the 
land unusable for its original purpose. Thus, the EHB reversed DEP’s 
release of Lessee. Lessee then appealed EHB’s decision. The court affirmed 
EHB’s decision. Lessee argued that Landowner failed to exhaust 
administrative remedies, however the court reasoned that Lessee failed to 
preserve this issue for review. Next, Lessee argued that Landowner did not 
satisfy the burden of proving that the land was not returned to original 
condition because Landowner did not present expert testimony. The court 
disagreed, reasoning that the Pennsylvania rules of evidence allow for 
layperson testimony if it is helpful to determining a fact at issue and is only 
based on the witness’s perception. Here the court held that Landowner’s 
testimony as to the condition of the land before and after the lease met the 
lay person testimony rule and was thus admissible. As such, the court held 
that Landowner met the burden of proof through his layperson testimony, 
and thus the EHB’s decision was affirmed. 
 
Hayward v. LPR Energy, LLC, No. 794 WDA 2018, 2019 WL 7388588 
(Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 31, 2019). 
 
Landowner sued Energy Company and Oil Company after Landowner 
assigned approximately 11,000 acres and claimed an overriding royalty 
interest (“ORRI”) on any oil and gas-producing wells built on the property. 
Neither Energy Company nor Oil company honored or acknowledged the 
ORRI. Landowner originally assigned the acreage at issue to Oil Company, 
who agreed to Landowner’s 3.125% royalty interest on all oil and gas 
produced on the land. Oil Company later assigned the lease to another 
company, which continued in a series of assignments until finally being 
assigned to Energy Company. The original master contract between 
Landowner and Oil Company was not officially recorded with the county 
until twelve years after it was executed. The trial court found that 
Landowner was entitled to an ORRI from Energy Company on the 
assignments that contained language referencing Landowner’s royalty 
interest in the amount of 1,987 acres, but not on the remaining acreage 
because Landowner’s royalty interest was not recorded in a timely manner 
as required by statute. Additionally, the trial court found that Oil Company 
breached its contract with Landowners because Oil Company did not 
disclose Landowners’ royalty interest to its successive assignees. The trial 
court set Oil Company’s breach of contract damages at $35,488,419. The 
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appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of 
Landowner. 
 
Texas 
WTX Fund, LLC v. Brown, No. 08-17-00104-CV, 2020 WL 91210 (Tex. 
App. – El Paso Jan. 8, 2020). 
 
Grantors’ Heirs appealed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to 
Grantees’ Heirs regarding disputed royalty interests in a 1951 mineral deed. 
The appellate court held that the deed was not unambiguous, and therefore 
construction was reviewed as a question of law. Additionally, the deed 
reserved Grantors’ Heirs non-participatory royalty interest for two reasons. 
First, the appellate court held that a “shall not affect” clause within the deed 
clearly reserved the royalty interest because of the plain language of the 
text. Second, the appellate court held that the use of the word “benefits” in 
the deed is a catch-all term for economic benefits and does not include the 
deed’s royalty interests. The appellate court reversed the partial summary 
judgment of the trial court and rendered partial judgment for Grantors’ 
Heirs and remanded to determine remedies. 
 
Pacheco v. Rodriguez, No. 08-19-00129-CV, 2020 WL 57884 (Tex. App. – 
El Paso Jan. 6, 2020). 
 
Dog Owner’s dog attacked a person on Homeowner’s property, and both 
parties were sued. Dog Owner filed a crossclaim against Homeowner, 
alleging that Homeowner was negligent in maintaining the fence that kept 
the dog out of Homeowner’s yard. Dog Owner also sought reputation 
damages from Homeowner, alleging that the original lawsuit had made 
them pariahs. Homeowner filed a motion to dismiss the crossclaim pursuant 
to the Texas Citizen Participation Act (“TCPA”), which protects free 
speech from retaliatory lawsuits meant to silence parties. Homeowner 
claimed Dog Owner’s request for reputation damages brought the 
crossclaim under the ambit of the TCPA. The trial court dismissed the 
motion, and this appeal followed. Homeowner first argued that Dog Owner 
never challenged the alleged defamatory statement, constituting a briefing 
waiver of the issue. The court ruled that a relaxed preservation rule was to 
be used to address motions to dismiss under the TCPA in order for the court 
to reach the merits of the case. Therefore, the court held Dog Owner had 
not waived the issue. Next, the court held that the TCPA did not apply to 
Dog Owner’s crossclaim. The court reasoned that the crossclaim alleged no 
publication by Homeowner and that reputational damages are not limited 
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solely to defamation claims, thus the TCPA did not apply to bar Dog 
Owner’s crossclaim. Furthermore, the court categorized Dog Owner’s 
crossclaim as either a claim for contribution or a claim for damages based 
on Homeowner’s breach of their duties to maintain the fence. The court 
reasoned that the TCPA did not apply to any of these categories of claim. 
For these reasons, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of 
Homeowner’s motion to dismiss. 
 
Peters v. Young, No. 11-18-00008-CV, 2019 WL 7372270 (Tex. App. – 
Eastland Dec. 31, 2019). 
 
Buyer attempted to purchase Seller’s lands pursuant to a Real Estate 
Contract and Option Agreement. The Option Agreement was to be 
exercised by Buyer signing and returning the Real Estate Contract to Seller. 
Buyer did so, however Seller refused to proceed under the Option Contract, 
causing Buyer to sue. The trial court ordered specific performance by 
Seller, which Seller appealed. The court affirmed the trial court’s order of 
specific performance. The court reasoned that the contracts were 
unambiguous, as the plain language and contextual reading of the contract 
supported an interpretation of the purchase price in accordance with 
Buyer’s interpretation, rather than Seller’s interpretation, which required an 
out of context reading of certain provisions. The court then held that Buyer 
properly executed the Option by performing the specific terms agreed upon 
by the parties, namely executing and returning the Real Estate Contract to 
Seller. The court further reasoned that, despite Seller’s contentions, Buyer’s 
testimony was sufficient evidence for the trial court to factually find that 
Buyer was always ready and willing to purchase the property, therefore the 
court refused to reverse on those grounds. Finally, the court found that there 
was never any meeting of the minds regarding consideration for the mineral 
interests underlying the property, and as such, the trial court did not order a 
sale of those interests. The court reasoned that both contracts’ separate 
reference to portions of the lands from those of the mineral interest showed 
that the parties had only agreed to considerations for the land, and as such, a 
sale of the mineral interest was not ordered. For these reasons, all of 
Seller’s contentions on appeal were overruled and specific conveyance 
from Seller to Buyer was affirmed. 
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Manor v. Manor, No. 02-18-00056-CV, 2019 WL 7407740 (Tex. App. – 
Fort Worth Dec. 31, 2019). 
 
Spouse-1 sued Spouse-2 regarding his interest in approximately 300 acres 
of land divided between them during their divorce proceedings. During the 
proceedings, Spouse-1 contracted with Spouse-2 to buy back some of the 
divided land, to which Spouse-2 agreed. Once the two parties signed their 
contract, however, Spouse-1 repeatedly delayed the closing. Spouse-1 then 
enforced a provision within their contract that awarded Spouse-2 the 
$35,000 earnest money payment provided by Spouse-1 as a penalty for 
missing the closing deadline established in the contract. Spouse-1 
subsequently filed this lawsuit, claiming that the contract was 
unenforceable because it did not satisfy the statute of frauds since the 
property was not sufficiently described. Spouse-1 also claimed that even if 
the contract was enforceable, Spouse-2 did not have a right to the earnest 
money as a matter of law. However, because Spouse-2 showed the 
existence of a valid and enforceable contract that sufficiently described the 
property, that she performed her duties under the contract, that Spouse-1 
breached the contract through his continuous closing delays, and that she 
was damaged as a result of Spouse-1’s breach, the appellate court upheld 
the judgement of the trial court in favor of Spouse-2. 
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SELECTED TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS DECISIONS 
Corporations 
 
N.D. Texas 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Mnuchin, No. 3:17-CV-1930-B, 2019 WL 7370430 
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 31, 2019). 
 
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) imposed a $2,000,000 fine 
on the Multi-National Oil and Gas Company (“Company”) for alleged 
violations of Ukraine-related sanctions from 2014. These sanctions 
included prohibitions against personal dealings with the Chairman of a 
Russian Corporation individually, but not with the Russian Corporation 
itself. OFAC rules promulgated under the sanctions defined “property” and 
“property interests” broadly, including contracts and services. Company 
executed eight contracts with Russian Corporation, which were signed by 
Chairman, after the sanctions, without seeking guidance from OFAC. 
Guidelines published after the contracts were executed indicated that 
dealings with sanctioned individuals, even in those individuals’ capacity as 
agents of non-sanctioned entities, would be violations. Previous guidelines 
gave an example that dealing with a sanctioned minister of a foreign 
government in the minister’s capacity as the head of a non-sanctioned 
foreign agency could still be violations, but noted that prohibitions could 
vary based on the policy concerns underlying that sanctions behind them. 
The court vacated the fines on the grounds that Company lacked fair notice 
due under the Fifth Amendment that its actions were prohibited. Fair notice 
requires regulated parties to be able to identify with “ascertainable 
certainty” the prohibited conduct from regulations and public statements 
issued by agencies. The Court found that the plain text of the regulations 
did not give fair notice. The Court notes that fair notice is connected to 
void-for-vagueness doctrine and thus Company noting seeking guidance is 
relevant, but not dispositive. Ultimately however, Company was entitled to 
rely on public statements for guidance; these statements, suggesting 
Company could still have dealing with Russian Corporation, meant that 
Company lacked fair notice its conduct was prohibited. 
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SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 
Federal 
 
4th Circuit 
Friends of Buckingham v. State Air Pollution Control Bd., No. 19-1152, 
2020 WL 63295 (4th Cir. Jan. 7, 2020). 
 
Environmental Group sought appeal of Government Agency decision to 
award a natural gas pipeline company a permit for construction of a 
compressor station. Environmental Group contends that Government 
Agency failed to consider electric turbines as a zero-emission alternative to 
the gas-fired turbines which were chosen. Additionally, Environmental 
Group contends that Government Agency failed to take into account the 
disproportionate health impacts on the community and failing to 
independently evaluate the viability of the site regarding its relationship to 
the African American community. Regarding the gas-power turbine 
decision, the court stated Government Agency action will survive a review 
if it “examined relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for 
its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the 
choice made.” The court found that there was no sufficient evidence to 
support the failure of the state department to consider electric turbines. 
Government Agency depended on “post hoc” justifications, such as the 
meaning of terms in its decision stating using the electric turbines would 
require an inadmissible “redefinition of source” by federal law. The court 
rejected this argument because post hoc justification are not appropriate for 
the court to consider for review, only the actual reasoning behind the 
decision. Overall, Government Agency decision was arbitrary and 
unsupported by substantial evidence. On the issue of Government Agency 
failure to independently evaluate the viability of the site and potential 
health risks, the court stated that Government Agency did not conduct 
proper research into how the Environmental Justice classification of the 
chosen area affected the impact the compressor may have on the health of 
the surrounding residents. The court stated that because the area was 
classified an Environmental Justice area, Government Agency was required 
to conduct research on the health effects regarding that area’s independent 
characteristics not characteristics of the general population. For these 
reasons, the court vacated the permit decision by Government Agency and 
remanded it back for proceedings consistent with these findings. 
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D. New Mexico  
WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 15-CV-159-WJ-
KBM, 2019 WL 7038201 (D.N.M. Dec. 20, 2019). 
 
United States Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) decided to replace 
earthen levees along the Rio Grande with superior, more durable levees. 
Advocacy Group filed a Motion for Summary Judgment contending that 
Corp’s actions threaten three endangered species and that agency failed to 
properly consider environmental impacts. The National Environmental 
Protection Act requires agencies to prepare Environmental Impact 
Statements before undertaking certain projects, which must include a 
discussion of alternative courses of action, and briefly discuss why those 
alternatives were not pursued. Advocacy Group was found to have 
suggested an alternative course of action during the public comment period. 
The Advocacy Group’s first contention that Corps defined its objection too 
narrowly, and thereby unreasonably precluded the Group’s suggested 
alternative, was rejected by the court as Corps had not acted in an arbitrary 
and capricious manner in defining the objection. The court also rejected the 
contention that Corps had not considered enough alternatives, noting Corps 
rejected several non-structural alternatives as insufficient to the goal of 
flood control. Furthermore, the court rejected the contention that Corps was 
required to consider a combination of multiple alternatives, rather than each 
alternative individually, as precedent suggesting such consideration might 
be required applied only where an agency’s analysis of alternatives was 
“perfunctory.” The court concluded that Corps complied with all of its 
statutory requirements in pursuing this project, and therefore denied the 
Advocacy Group’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  
 
D. Oregon 
W. Watershed Project v. Bernhardt, No. 2:19-CV-0750-SI, 2019 WL 
7040923 (D. Oregon Dec. 20, 2019). 
 
Advocacy Groups brought suit against the Secretary of the Interior for, on 
his last day in office, granting a Grazing Permit to Ranching Company on 
federal lands without proper review. Two shareholders of the Family-
Owned Ranching Company had previously been convicted of and 
sentenced for setting fires on grazing lands in violation of law. Because of 
this, the government revoked the Ranching Company’s earlier permit, 
noting their “callous disregard for human life.” However, the shareholders 
received a Presidential Pardon on July 10, 2018. The Secretary received a 
guidance memo from the office of the solicitor general, which noted that 
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the pardon eliminated the punishment, and not the crime, so the crime could 
still be considered by the government in granting the Permit. However, the 
pardon could also be considered as part of potentially changed 
circumstances since the revocation of the last permit. In an approximately 
three-page decision advising the government to grant the permit, the 
Secretary summarized the entire factual history of the case and the entire 
procedural history of the case, described the applicable law, and set out his 
legal analysis. The Court found that the Secretary had not conducted an 
adequate analysis to show that the Ranching Company was in substantial 
compliance with adequate law, as considering only the punishment and 
pardons did not sufficiently examine all the relevant factors. So, the Court 
granted the Advocacy Groups’ Motion for Summary Judgment, vacated the 
grant of the permit, and remanded to the agency. 
 
W.D. Wisconsin 
United States v. Superior Refining Co. LLC, No. 10-CV-563-BBC, 2019 
WL 7037791 (W.D. Wisconsin Dec. 20, 2019). 
 
The United States, Wisconsin, the Louisiana Department of Environmental 
Quality, a Wisconsin Refinery, and Louisiana Refinery are parties to a 
consent order dating back to February 2011. That consent order has been 
modified twice, in May 2012 and again in May 2019. The parties have 
negotiated a third modification to account for the fallout from a 2018 
explosion at the Wisconsin Refinery. However, in December 2018, 
Wisconsin passed a law requiring the state Justice Department to get 
legislative approval before settling certain cases. The Wisconsin Attorney-
General asked the Court to declare that the law does not apply to this case 
so that the state Justice Department can modify the order without approval 
from the legislature. The Court declined for lack of ripeness, stating it 
would not be appropriate to issue an advisory opinion to interpret state law. 
However, the Court also noted that the parties could still file to have the 
modifications approved, and that the Court would not need to determine if 
the state followed its own policies to approve the modifications. 
 
State 
 
California 
People v. Wetle, 43 Cal.App.5th 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019). 
 
In 2016, Officers of the California Department of Fish and Wildlife found 
illegal crab traps in the Soquel Canyon State Marine Conservation Area. 
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Tags and permits attached to the traps identified Fisherman as the owner of 
the property. The first-degree principal confessed to placing the traps in the 
protected area and stated that he had leased them from Fisherman. This 
actor was not employed by Fisherman, nor did Fisherman tell him to place 
the traps in that area. Fisherman was charged with twenty-eight 
misdemeanor counts of violating 14 CCR § 632 and 14 CCR § 180.2. 
Following a four-day trial, the jury convicted Fisherman on all counts. The 
conviction was affirmed by the Monterey County Superior Court’s 
appellate division. Fisherman contended that there was insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction when it was undisputed that the other 
person placed the traps, but the Attorney General argued that Fisherman 
was vicariously liable because he entrusted his traps with the principal in 
the first-degree. Even though the counts charged are strict liability offenses 
requiring no proof of mental state, the prosecution still had to prove 
Fisherman’s action was criminal. The Attorney General argued that 
entrusting the traps with the first-degree principal was an act sufficient to 
merit criminal liability. Fisherman’s contention that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a conviction was rejected. However, the Court of 
Appeals reversed and remanded the case upon holding that the trial court 
failed to adequately instruct the jury. The jurors were not required to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Fisherman performed an act prohibited by 
California law. 
 
Kentucky 
Quest Energy Corp. v. Slone, NO. 2018-CA-001239-MR, 2019 WL 
6998654 (Ky. Ct. App. December 20, 2019). 
 
Seller sold coal assets to Energy Company (“Company”). After Company 
failed to pay Seller royalty payments owed under agreement, Seller brought 
an action for payment of more than $2,000,000.00 and an accounting of 
coal mined. Company asserted the agreement was not breached and, in the 
alternative, argued the original agreement between the parties was 
modified. Company also counterclaimed alleging Seller made 
misrepresentations to Company to induce purchase of the assets. The trial 
court dismissed the counterclaim and awarded Seller over $2,500,000.00. 
Company appealed on the basis that the trial court’s findings of fact were 
not supported by evidence and the conclusions of law were erroneous. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The evidence suggested Company 
was not fraudulently induced to enter into the agreement. Rather, the 
Company did not properly conduct their own due diligence prior to the 
consummation of the agreement. Moreover, the letter purportedly altering 
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the terms of the agreement was ambiguous. As such, it is to be held against 
the drafter. This letter, construed against the Company, could not be 
interpreted as amending the original asset purchase agreement. 
 
Louisiana 
Allison v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., No. 19-523, 2019 WL 6886812 (La. Ct. 
App. Dec. 18, 2019). 
 
Petroleum Refiner appealed a trial court judgment awarding damages to 
twelve Workers in a personal injury suit. The suit arose from a spill of slop 
oil from Petroleum Refiner facility in southeast Louisiana that released 
toxic substances into the air and water that contaminated natural resources 
and presented severe dangers to surrounding biological organisms, 
including humans. Workers of Petroleum Refiner’s facility claim personal 
injuries caused via exposure to the substances while remediating the spill. 
Following a trial ruling for Workers, Petroleum Refiner appealed the 
judgment, asserting that the court abused its discretion by relying heavily 
on Worker’s pretrial memorandum in forming its final judgment and for 
awarding damages to Workers for injuries that were unsupported by the 
trial record. The Court of Appeals quickly dispensed with the first asserted 
error, explaining that reliance on Workers’ memorandum was irrelevant to 
the validity of the judgment, because “the reasons for judgment are not the 
judgment itself.” The Court of Appeals then affirmed the amount of general 
damages awarded to all but one of the twelve Workers. The award of 
medical expenses for the one Worker was deducted by approximately $400 
because there was not any expert testimony that linked the Worker’s facial 
swelling to his exposure to the toxins. 
 
Pennsylvania 
Philadelphia Gas Works. V. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, No. 1404 
C.D. 2018, 2019 WL 6698103, (Pa. Commw. Ct. Dec. 9, 2019).  
 
Gas Company petitioned for review of a final order issued by the 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (“Commission”), which concluded 
that the Commission no longer had jurisdiction over rate issues related to 
the bills issued by Gas Company. Under that ruling, the late fees issued by 
Gas Company were no longer applicable to unpaid gas bills once liens 
attach to those bills. The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania recognized 
that the legal issues raised in this appeal were analogous to those in 
Philadelphia Gas Works v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Pa. 
Commw., No. 1291 C.D. 2018, filed December 9, 2019) (PGW I) and 
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Philadelphia Gas Works v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Pa. 
Commw., No. 1405 C.D. 2018, filed December 9, 2019) (PGW III). The 
court followed their prior reasoning in the PGW I case, and subsequently 
held that the Pennsylvania Utility Commission case dated October 4, 2018 
is reversed. 
 
Texas 
Creative Oil & Gas v. Lona Hills Ranch, NO. 18-0565, 2019 WL 6971659 
(Tex. December 20, 2019). 
 
Ranch brought trespass and trespass to try title actions against Oil and Gas 
Operator (“Operator”). Ranch alleged the underlying lease expired due to 
cessation of production. Lessee intervened. Ranch then dropped its trespass 
and title actions against Operator but maintained them with regard to 
Lessee. In response, Operator and Lessee brought various counterclaims 
against Ranch. The counterclaims fall into two categories. Under category 
number one, Operator and Lessee allege Ranch falsely told production 
purchasers from the lease that the lease was expired and that production 
payments should cease. Under the second category, Operator and Lessee 
maintain Ranch breached the lease by filing this suit and bringing an 
administrative action in the Railroad Commission seeking to terminate the 
lease. At the court of appeals, Ranch moved to dismiss the counterclaims on 
the theory that the counterclaims violated the Texas Citizens Participation 
Act (“TCPA”). TCPA permits a party to dismiss an action related to a 
party’s exercise of free speech or the right to petition. The court of appeals 
dismissed all of Operator’s counterclaims and the Lessee’s category one 
counterclaim. The Texas Supreme Court held that Ranch’s communications 
to purchasers were not protected by the TCPA as these communications did 
not fall within the areas of speech covered by the TCPA. While the TCPA 
protects speech made generally about products in the marketplace, the 
purchase of hydrocarbons from a particular lease cannot be fairly construed 
as speech generally made in a broader marketplace. So, the first category of 
counterclaims was not dismissed. The second category of counterclaims, 
however, falls under the protection of the TCPA. Accordingly, the 
judgment dismissing the operator’s counterclaim with regard to the breach 
of lease was affirmed. Ranch did not file a timely appeal challenging the 
lessee’s counterclaim under category two. 
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Crawford v. XTO Energy, Inc., No. 02-18-00217-CV, 2019 WL 6904298 
(Tex. App. – Fort Worth Dec. 19, 2019). 
 
In 1964, Grantor conveyed a parcel of land to Electrical Service Company 
while retaining the mineral rights. In 1984, Grantor conveyed land adjacent 
to the Electrical Service Company plot to another party, but the conveying 
instrument did not explicitly state anything about mineral rights. Grantor 
passed away in 2007 and Successor assumed interest in the parcel. 
Successor filed suit against Company, which had obtained interest in the 
parcel from the 1984 purchaser. The dispute centered on what benefits and 
interests were reserved by Grantor in the 1984 conveyance. The trial court 
ruled in favor of Company pursuant to a motion for summary judgment 
based on the strip-and-gore doctrine. This doctrine presumes that a grantor 
did not intend to reserve interest in a slim parcel of land that adjoins land 
conveyed. Based on the language of the 1964 and 1984 deeds, the Court of 
Appeals concluded that the doctrine applied. Because the strip-and-gore 
doctrine applied to the 1984 conveyance and Successor failed to raise a 
dispute of fact in rebuttal, the grant of summary judgment was affirmed. 
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